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浙江万里学院本科毕业论文 偏远山区农村公共服务质量评价与改进机制研究

以及服务的使用成本。只对例外的和必要的小额消费进行补贴。

补贴的设置与可取的服务输送机制紧密联系在一起。补贴通过服务供应链流转。补贴会通过各种方式发放给服务供应商。

饮水供给：

饮用水，或者退一步说，卫生系统服务，在农村地区经常是优先得到的。为改良的服务付费的意愿随服务距离和服务质量，水质，卫生设备，还有顾客的健康观念而定。农村地区改良用水的解决方案经常具有地方特色，水处理和输送服务常被作为是一个该地区的突出系统。在水资源稀缺或者社区相聚较近的地区，联网解决方案具有经济意义。不同的产水技术有与其相应的服务水平选项，这些选项范围从共用设施到家庭终端等。卫生系统的服务水平与技术选择则根据人口规模与卫生要求程度，供水服务水平，消费税等而定。比较适合发展中国家大部分农村地区的解决方案是实地卫生系统。有时候在一些大型社区里面会装一些阴沟和污水处理系统，但是成本很高。

在经过为获得被分散在农村各个地区的合理的供水系统奋斗了数年后，很多国家现在把集中的供应驱动式的服务供给模式转变为分散的需求驱动式的供应模式。农村地区的供水系统一般由特定的国家机构或地方机构出资修建，然后交由非营利性公众组织运营管理，比如，供水合作委员会。公众组织在简单的供水与卫生系统上做的越来越好，虽然他们只是处理一些简单小额的项目而且还不能积累资金或者发展技术来升级完善系统完善。越来越多的国家正在寻找新的可持续的农村供水系统模式，大部分倾向于通过管理合同，租赁合同或者特许权的 7形式来让私人部门运营现有服务系统。

最近有几个供应竞争的例子。有些企业为特定补贴而提供新终端并进行现有系统升级。 在巴拉圭，它的目标是在 2010 年前对多达 2 百万的农村人口提供自来水服务，使覆盖率达到 85%。在一场小规模试验计划中，负责提供服务的国家机构争取了一个 10 年的独家特权用来设计，建造并运营供水系统，而这个系统覆盖 4个小镇，12000 人。特许权获得者将能得到每终端 150 美元的补贴。在投标前，为未计量的终端征收的税被定在 5.26 美元每月以及最初 12 立方米的每月 3.95美元的税加上未计量过的终端的额外每立方米 0.53 美元的税，从而使服从于原则上的周期性调整。设计和服务标准也在之前确立。特许权将被给向终端使用收费最低的地方供水系统和建筑承包商。双方合同将把 SENASA，社区，还有承包商运营商全多联系到服务中去。截止 2003 年 8 月，四个系统中两个已经完成并投入运营。在波多黎各的纳纳瓦和靠近进亚松森的地区，第二个投标正在进行当中。它将拥有更大更多社区的特许权，并能满足 7600 人的使用。在第二次试验中，税和终端点收费已

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浙江万里学院本科毕业论文 偏远山区农村公共服务质量评价与改进机制研究

经实现与参加试验的社区谈妥。投标人所要求的一次性补贴将被作为招标变量使用。

在哥伦比亚，建筑承包公司经常被邀请投标建立并运营水和污物处理系统10 到 25 年。地区则一般是总人口小于 12000 的小自治区。这些合同一般会给投资补贴要求最低的竞标者。投资预计将在 0.5 到 1.0 美元每直辖市米。补贴将包含 70的投资，也就是 300 美元每终端点或者 60 美元每服务对象。只有同意支付至少涵盖运营与维护成本的费用的自治区才有资格参加。合同双方是承建运营商和自治区，后者将对监督和项目实施负责。家庭自来水用户预计将在未来 2到 5 年内由不足 60提高到 90而使用污水处理系统的比例由不足 30提高到超过 70。供水覆盖率在纳纳瓦镇达到了 100，而污水处理系统覆盖率也达到了同样的水平，在两年内达到 24 小时连续供水的合同也已经签署。

原文出处：比约韦斯纽斯，福斯特，卡沃尔.农村公共基础设施服务的私人供给：补贴的竞争.世界银行政策研究工作文件3365号，2004.08

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浙江万里学院本科毕业论文 偏远山区农村公共服务质量评价与改进机制研究

附录三：外文文献原文

Private Provision of Rural Infrastructure Services：

Competing for Subsidies

Three billion people live in rural areas worldwide and many lack communication，electricity ，water ，sanitation and transportation services that are deemed essential for economic development and directly impact the quality of life. Monopoly provision，inmost countries by the public sector，often leads to high investment and running costs weak operation and maintenance， and limited responsiveness to local needs. Market distortions，government intervention，and hidden subsidies fail to promote efficient use of resources to meet social objectives， effectively target the poor，account for costs and benefits，or reduce dependence on subsidies.

Market-oriented economic reforms have opened the way to more effective solutions for infrastructure services based on private sector provision，cost recovery through tariffs，increasingly competitive markets，and regulation where sufficient competition does not materialize. These reforms aim at accelerating service growth and innovation,making production more efficient,and increasing responsiveness to differing user needs and payment capabilities.

Gaps typically remain，however between what service providers are prepared to do solely on commercial grounds and what governments consider necessary from broader development perspectives. Many rural areas and,to a lesser extent,low-income urban areas,continue to be excluded.

Subsidies may be justified to narrow these gaps. Loosely speaking,a subsidy exists when the costs incurred in supplying a service are not fully recovered from the revenues raised by selling this service,the difference being met by other customers in the same or related industries or by governments (Wad dams Price 2000).The economic rationale for subsidy is based on the existence of consumption and production externalities network externalities and scale economies. Also,access to these services at affordable prices is considered essential to enable the rural population to participate equitably and effectively in a modern society(Serra 2000).

Rural subsidy practices

In the context of market-oriented economic policies,subsidies for rural infrastructure services aim at developing sustainable markets for the private provision of these services. Subsidies are

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浙江万里学院本科毕业论文 偏远山区农村公共服务质量评价与改进机制研究

designed to turn socially desirable investments that are not profitable by themselves into commercially viable undertakings. Projects that are not demonstrably good for society at large or are unlikely to ever stand on their own do not justify subsidy support and are seldom undertaken.

Good subsidy practice commits all participants to contribute to financing the provision of services:

Service providers invest and risk their own resources to set up the facilities and provide the services during a given time under specified conditions.

Government subsidies help service providers meet some investment and start-up costs. Subsidies are designed to reduce access barriers to which low-income groups are especially sensitive,such as initial connection,equipment or installation charges.

Customers pay for the use of services at least as much as is needed to meet operating and maintenance costs. Where domestic installations are involved, customers are also required to pay part of the investment cost, as a confirmation of economic demand for service and commitment to pay for service use. Consumption is subsidized only exceptionally and limited to small amounts of service regarded as essential.

The design of subsidies is closely tied to the available service delivery mechanisms. Subsidies are channeled through the service supply chain in ways that aim at being neutral with respect to competition among service providers ,service alternatives, and technologies.

Water supply

Potable water and, to a lesser extent, sanitation services, are often a priority for rural communities. Willingness to pay for improved services depends on the distance to, and quality of ,existing sources of water and sanitation facilities, as well as the consumers’ perceptions of the health threats of unimproved services.Solutions to improved water supplies in rural areas are almost always localized, the water supply (be it ground or surface water) and its treatment and distribution being provided in each community as a stand-alone system. Network solutions only make economic sense in areas where water sources are scarce or expensive, or where communities are close to one another. For each water technology there are also service level options, which can range from shared facilities (public stand posts orcommunity hand pumps) to house connections (individual hand pump, yard tap, or in-house plumbing). For sanitation services the choice of technology and service level depends on population size and concentration, water service level

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浙江万里学院本科毕业论文 偏远山区农村公共服务质量评价与改进机制研究

and consumption rates, and soil permeability. For most rural areas in developing countries, the appropriate solution will be an on-site sanitation system (latrine or septic tank). Piped sewer and wastewater treatment systems are sometimes installed in larger communities, but costs are high.

After years of struggling to achieve sustainable rural water systems scattered in communities across the rural landscape, most countries have now shifted from centralized supply-driven service provision models to decentralized demand-responsive ones. Rural water systems are often financed and constructed through programs managed by specialized national or regional agencies, and then handed over to be operated and maintained by community-based organizations, such as water committees andcooperatives.14 Community-based organizations have done well managing the day-to-day operations of simple water and sanitation systems, although they often operate on very tenuous financial grounds and are unable to accumulate savings or develop the technical capacity to undertake major repairs, or system expansions. Countries are now looking for new models of sustainable rural water systems, increasingly turning to the private sector to help run existing services through management contracts, leases and concessions.

There are recent cases of applying competition among firms for subsidized concessions to provide new connections and upgrade existing systems.

In Paraguay the target is to provide piped water service to about 2.0 million people in rural areas, reaching 85 percent population coverage by 2010. During a pilot project, the national agency responsible for service provision (SENASA)invited competitive bids for a 10-year exclusive concession to design, build, and operate water supply systems in four small towns with a combined population of about 12000. The concessionaire receives a one-time subsidy of 150 per completed connection. Prior to bidding the tariff was fixed at 5.26 per month for unmetered connections and at $3.95 per month for the first 12 m3plus $0.53 per additional m3 for metered connections, subject to periodic adjustments following a formula. Design and service standards (water quality, continuity, pressure) were also set upfront. The concession was awarded to a consortium of construction contractors and a local water system operator that bid to charge the lowest connection fee to users ($62). Three bilateral contracts among SENASA, the communities, and the contractor-operator tie all parties into the project.15 As of August 2003 two of the four systems had been completed and were in operation.16 A second tender was under preparation for a larger multi-community concession in Nanawa, Puerto Falcón, and Beteretecue near Asunción,

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